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TRAINING A SPIRIT-FILLED MINISTRY

THE ASBURY SEMINARIAN

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ASBURY THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
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The Asbury Seminarian

J. C. MCPHEETERS

The Asbury Seminarian makes its bow in this initial number, to stand as a comrade-at-arms with many other periodicals already in the field, to contend for the fundamentals of the evangelical faith. It is not our hope or thought to supplant, or even improve upon some of the splendid theological journals which have long been extant. It is our hope that we might be an added voice in reaching a constituency which will add to the sum total of the sphere of strength and influence of the theological reviews which are contending for "the faith once delivered to the saints."

The content of theological thought has a more far-reaching influence upon the life of the world than the average person realizes. Two theologians and a philosopher were largely responsible for the anti-Christian views of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, patron saints of communism. The theologians were David Strauss and Bruno Baur. The philosopher was Ludwig Feuerbach. Otto Ruhle, one of the biographers of Karl Marx, places the origin of Marx' denial of Christianity to the writings of these men.

The currents of modern philosophical thought are largely materialistic. The currents of modern theological thought are in a large measure humanistic. Over against these trends, *The Asbury Seminarian* will stand uncompromisingly for supernaturalism.

The supernaturalism of the Bible and the essential message of Christianity have been stoutly contested from the beginning. The contest rages today along new battle lines, with a magnitude never before known in history.

Perhaps no man has better defined the secret of the opposition to the supernaturalism of the Bible than George Santayana, an avowed agnostic, and former professor of philosophy at Harvard University. He says: "The modernist wishes to reconcile the church and the world; therein he forgets what Christianity came into the world to announce and why its message was believed. It came to announce salvation from the world. Having no ears for this essential message of Christianity, the modernist also has no eyes for its history."

The desupernaturalizing of Christianity, in an attempt to bring it into accord with the prevailing world view, is a devastating blow of the first magnitude to New Testament Christianity.

It is against these increasingly devitalizing encroachments on the Christian faith that *The Asbury Seminarian* unfolds her banner and takes her stand and pledges her faith and allegiance to the supernatural as well as human Christ of the four gospels.

Who's Who In This Issue

JULIAN C. McPHEETERS is president of Asbury Theological Seminary, having succeeded the founder, Henry Clay Morrison, to this office. An alumnus of Marvin College, he has received honorary degrees from Asbury College and John Brown University. He is pastor of Glide Memorial Methodist Church in San Francisco, vice-president of the Glide Foundation, and editor of the Pentecostal Herald.

FRED HALSEY LARABEE is vice-president and dean of Asbury Theological Seminary. A graduate of the University of Vermont, he holds the B. D. degree from Drew University, and has received an honorary degree from Asbury College. Since 1925 he has been professor of Greek in the Seminary.

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ANNE W. KUHN is a graduate of John Fletcher College, and holds the A.M. degree from Boston University. She was a fellowship student in the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University; her article published here is the result of research in philosophy of education in that institution.

HAROLD B. KUHN, currently editor of this quarterly, is Glide Professor of Philosophy of Religion in Asbury Theological Seminary. An alumnus of John Fletcher College, he holds the degrees of S.T.B., S.T.M., and Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Editorial--

The Crisis in Theological Education Today

The triumph of the mood of the Renaissance over the spirit of the Reformation set the pattern for modern culture, until nothing less than the most grave sort of external breakdown in civilization could compel a re-evaluation of the initial assumptions of the Renaissance. Such a breakdown has occurred; and the facts of contemporary culture have compelled sober thinkers outside the church to seek the causes of our present distress in the falsity or the inadequacy of the presuppositions which have shaped modern life. In an hour in which technological progress might be expected to beget high hopes, thoughtful laymen share the pessimism of prophets. Newspaper columnists no longer suggest that we are engaged in a race against annihilation merely to sell copy; they rather voice the justified fears of multitudes when they suggest that modern science may serve to pull down the house of our culture upon us.

Modern theological education finds itself peculiarly involved in this situation. In Europe the dialectical theologians saw the handwriting on the wall at the end of World War I. Karl Barth and Emil Brunner were, from some points of view, men ahead of their time at this point. To say this is not to give a blanket endorsement of either the methods or the conclusions of these men. Much in their systems seems inconsistent, especially their attempt to salvage some type of evangelicalism out of a view of revelation which logically cuts the nerve of evangelical Christianity. But these men perceived that theology (and with theology, theological education) had erred in allying itself too closely with the culture by which it was surrounded. In so doing, theology and theological education have made the crisis of modern culture their own crisis.

* * *

The breakdown of the medieval synthesis exposed in new form the dualism of *sacred* and *secular*. The triumph of the Renaissance offered a solution to this problem at the secular level. This does not mean that the term 'sacred' has been lost from the vocabulary of modern man. It means rather that its essential meaning has been lost in the merger, so that in an attempt to "render the whole of life sacred" the modern man has immersed himself in secularity without knowing it. In all this there is manifested a lack of appreciation of the real significance of sacredness. Romanticism has supposedly denatured the usual Christian usage of the term, so that the most that is intellectually defensible at this point is a broadening of the base of the secular, until all of life can be seen in essentially sacred terms. In this the modern man seeks to pass too easily from reason to spirit, and from spirit to God. Thus the sanctification of human life, either individual or collective, is attempted at an easy level, with the result that secularity triumphs completely over an attenuated view of the sacred.¹

Theology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sought to steer a middle course between the opposing forces of Reformation and Renaissance. In the nineteenth century, however, this attempt at aloofness was abandoned, and a new type of approach carried the day. Henceforth theology must conform to the temper of the times. Theologians concealed whatever dissatisfaction they may have felt with the solution of the dualism of sacred-secular at the level of secularity, and turned with good heart to the task of rendering theology palatable to the man of modern mood. Nothing was sought more eagerly than an alliance of theology with the presuppositions of modern secular culture.

Involved in all this was a rather definite philosophy of the church—a philosophy far removed from either the Catholic or the Reformation view. Catholicism has understood the church in terms of a religio-political entity, and no concessions which individual Catholics have made in the direction of ecumenicity should be understood without reference to this unchanging principle. When concessions are made by the familiar triad of Protestant-Catholic-Jew, it will ultimately be found that the principle of *semper ibidem* will be tenaciously maintained by Rome, and that compromise will be at the expense of Protestantism and/or Judaism. This digression may be pardoned by the reader, if it can be shown that the modern philosophy of the church is best understood with reference to opposing views.

The conception of the church in the Reformation was essentially that of a society within a society, exerting a saving impact upon the world, but maintaining its peculiar existence, and when necessary challenging the presuppositions of the existing order. Repudiating the absolute claim of the Church to objective authority, Reformed Protestantism insisted upon an authority of its own, upon the basis of which it could maintain its integrity as an organization as well as maintain its inner life. In this it asserted its right to remain 'in the world but not of the the world,' and reiterated its conviction that sacred and secular were not identical, nor even aspects of the same thing.

The theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has felt no such inhibitions. It has extended the synthesis of sacred-secular which was characteristic of the later Renaissance so as to reshape its entire philosophy of the church. Henceforth the church's mission is to be conceived in terms of the steersman at the helm of society. She must rethink her message in terms palatable to modern culture, so that contemporary man, far from being

scandalized by her prophetic message, will place her at the van in the forward push of civilization. But theology has not always pondered the price at which she has obtained such freedom. No longer caught in the embarrassment of the dualism of sacred-secular, she nevertheless finds herself embarrassed by a situation in which capitulation to the here-and-now is threatening mankind with self-destruction.

Secularism must be understood in terms of a loss of something vital in human life and experience. It is not primarily the result of irreligion or non-religion, but may exist in the midst of much religion. It issues, rather, from a loss of perspective in life.

In it a dimension has been lost, or obviated, or ignored. It signifies a fracture of the faith, a loss of conscious rapport with the ideal, a loss of the sense of the presence of God, a denial. It divorces man's act from the permanent implications of his action; or it gives to his act only temporal implications. Meaning is localized, having no ultimate justification. Greatness is diminished, having no unimpeachable significance.²

The church, insofar as she loses her sense of the reality of the eternal and the unseen, becomes secular. It has been the perennial problem of Christianity to maintain the balance between emphasis upon the other-worldly factor in which lies the heart of her life and ministry, and the fulfillment of her duty to the temporal world. Occasions rise in which the claims of the two seem to clash; in the adjudication of such disputes, modern theology has been mortally disposed to yield the claims of the former in favor of the demands of the latter.

It is by no means clear at this moment whether theology can, in the long run, maintain the respect of the world upon the basis of such a program. In those situations in which civilization maintains an even keel, pure secularity is disposed to accept with gratitude whatever suggestions of religious or quasi-religious nature may come from

the church at the point of social problems. It is yet to be determined, however, whether the world outside the church may not have a deep intuition that the message of Christianity ought to be primarily concerned with super-temporal matters, so that whatever counsels she may offer in areas of human social and political life will be flavored with those considerations which transcend man's earthly existence. Perhaps the world may be less fascinated by a church that seeks to ride the crest of the 'wave of the future' than today's theological education has assumed. Possibly the modern man may perceive the ultimate barrenness of the solution of the human problem at the level of pure science, and find himself at long last in the ranks of those whom Reinhold Niebuhr describes as "expecting a Christ."³

The basic problem raised by the attempted solution in modern theology of the dualism of sacred-secular at the level of an extended secularism is the problem of continuity. In this connection it is necessary to call attention to the fact that ideas frequently serve to give unity and pattern to historical periods. Such ideas may be suppressed or concealed; they may seem unimportant in themselves. Nevertheless, they may be more powerful as directive and shaping factors than technical discoveries. Alfred North Whitehead has called our attention to this fact with force in his volume *Adventures of Ideas*. It will assist us in viewing the crisis in modern theological education to discover both the manner and the extent to which the idea of continuity has served to condition modern thought, within and without the realm of theology.

Edwin Ewart Aubrey said in the hearing of the writer that the problem of continuity was problem number one to contemporary theology. If this be true (and there is much evidence that it is true), then there is strong reason to study the manner in which today's

theology has sought to come to terms with modern secular culture. This in turn necessitates an examination of the degree to which modern thought has been dominated by the motif of continuity. The system of Hegel sought a synthesis of the ancient antithesis of history and reason. The continuity of the historical process seemed to him underwritten by the continuity of the divine mind, of which history was but the manifestation. Human institutions, beliefs, and customs were viewed as products of a dialectical process by which the older forms are constantly supplanted by more reasonable ones.

The doctrine of continuity became for Hegel the cornerstone of a magnificent system, which rose to a dominant position in western thought by the beginning of our century. It may be questioned, however, whether a system so obviously rationalistic would have become the dominant intellectual force outside Germany had it not been supported by the biological theory of Darwin, with the publication of whose volume *The Origin of Species* in 1859 began the real domination of western thought by the general concept of continuity. Edwin A. Burt puts it as follows:

The main significance of Darwin lay in the fact that in his hands the theory of organic evolution in general, and of natural selection in particular, became an empirically verified hypothesis—that is, it was couched in such form as to permit prediction of a great variety of observable facts whose actual presence subsequent investigation confirmed.⁴

Without agreeing with Dr. Burt's confident assertions that in Darwin the view of natural selection became an 'empirically verified hypothesis' and that 'subsequent investigation confirmed' its main theses, we will comment that Darwin was *accepted as having proved his case*, and that this acceptance rendered the general idea of continuity sufficiently credible as to make it the most powerful idea in the moulding of the mind of modern man.

From this it appears that much of the controversy which raged about Darwinism between 1860 and 1900 was a battle over a sideshow, which failed to perceive the deeper issue involved, and to see the role of Darwin in rendering acceptable an idea of more profound and far-reaching character than the doctrine of organic evolution could possibly be. The term 'evolution' was extended to connote the conception of continuity; it was thus applied to the entire range of cultural phenomena, and in the course of its application, the idea underwent formulation and definition.

The searching manner in which the concept of continuity was applied to the totality of human life and culture reflects the modern passion for the prediction and control of nature. The factor which conditioned the search for data was the factor of predictable sequence. Phenomena which contributed to this end were utilized, while there was probably an unconscious suppression of factors which failed to contribute to the support of modernity's leading motive. The backward extension of the idea of continuity led to a restatement of the category of causality. Against the former dictum of common sense, that there can be nothing in the effect that was not, in some sense, contained in the cause, modern thought has insisted that the whole question of causality be reinterpreted to allow for the emergence of novelty in the ongoing process. According to this latter view, effects do not merely manifest some of the perfections of a cause; rather, out of simple antecedents come increasingly complex entities.

Within the system of emergents, there is an essential continuity; inorganic matter, organic life, and conscious life—these are not graded levels of existence, to be accounted for by creation as historic Theism has insisted. Rather, these terms are but convenient tags for types within the scheme of continuous entities. It is

not difficult to see that the cosmic extension of the evolutionary principle represents a wide departure from the views of the western world during the first seventeen centuries of our era.

Applied to history, the idea of continuity yielded the conclusion that the forces now operative have always operated, and will continue indefinitely to operate. This uniformitarian viewpoint rules out creation by fiat, providential direction of the world from without, and any such intervention in the natural order as the biblical doctrine of miracles would presuppose. The most that could be claimed for God was that some divine purpose had supervised the long process of evolution, and that history represents somehow the unfolding of His mind or the realization of His own states. The history of peoples was a process of the development of societies from lower to higher states or organization. The prospect for the future can, upon this basis, be nothing more than the manifestation of the dynamism resident within forces which have always been at work.

Applied to man, the principle of continuity denies to him any high origin. It asserts rather that he is of common ancestry with other primates. His life is continuous with the other forms of life observable in nature. His origin and his development are placed within natural law, and his special dignity as a creation of God is ruled out.⁵ Any differences between him and the animals are merely quantitative; qualitatively he is one with them. Implicit in this view is that there is immanent in the life-process that which constantly strives toward the achievement of higher forms. At this point the modern view of continuity has left far behind the theories of Darwin, Lamarck, and De Vries. The current interpretation of the means by which a continuous world-system has emerged is based upon the vitalism of Henri Bergson, C. Lloyd Morgan, Samuel Alexander, L. T. Hobhouse, Jan C.

Smuts, and Alfred North Whitehead. Contemporary vitalism seeks to make a place for God within the process; in general, these thinkers have sought to identify Deity with (1) the urge within the process; and (2) some aspect of the end-product.

Within the systems of the emergent evolutionists there appears a degree of uncertainty concerning the precise character of the continuity between the higher aspects of human nature on the one hand, and the qualities observable in lower forms of life. This uncertainty tends toward a disparagement of reason, and an exaltation of the function of instinctive responses.⁶ It is probably inevitable that the maintenance of the motif of continuity in the relation of man to other levels of life shall result in a disparagement of human mental and moral powers. Emergent evolution is seeking to deal with this problem in such a way as to avoid too much emphasis upon man's indebtedness to his purely physical heritage.

Applied to society, the principle of continuity yields the conclusion that there has been an even *quantum* of factors at work throughout history. Beginning with the simplest of social organization, collective man has been developing techniques for social living. His religious development is but a phase of his social unfolding. The prophets of continuity have asserted that all races have had a parallel social and religious history. Some races have, it is true, outstripped others in the degree of attainment which they reached; but any superiority in such matters is held to issue from factors within the total process, and not from any such intervening providence as historic Christianity had believed to have been present. Rather, the social and religious development of man has come as a result of factors which have worked uniformly and continuously throughout human history.

Such a view cannot but take a forward look. The vigorous application of the principle under consideration

must assume that whatever will occur in the future must be the outgrowth of forces now at work. It must, moreover, view any reversals of the forward movement in society as but temporary, since no one has seriously advocated the concept of continuity without also insisting that progress is an ultimate law of life. Reinhold Niebuhr criticizes this assumption in the following words:

But when the various connotations of the idea of 'growth' are made more explicit a fateful divergence between the Christian and the modern interpretation of human destiny becomes apparent. As we have previously noted, the whole of modern secular culture (and with it that part of the Christian culture which is dependent upon it) assumes that growth means progress. It gives the idea of growth a moral connotation. It believes that history moves from chaos to cosmos by forces immanent within it. We have sought to prove that history does not support this conclusion.⁷

It is true that the events of this century have shaken the faith of some in the nineteenth century dogma of indefinite progress. Some readjustment seems inevitable, whether it be in the direction of redefining our goals, or whether it involve a re-evaluating of our values.

One of the most daring attempts at a philosophy of society was made by Auguste Comte, whose division of man's social history into three epochs: the era of religion, the era of metaphysics, and the era of positive science, is well known. His treatment of the function of religion in the human process is more daring than most of the disciples of continuity would allow. Comte expressed himself in favor of bowing religion out of the front door, with thanks for past services rendered. Modern theological education credits itself with making religion sufficiently respectable to the scientific age as to allow its retention in the house. The question remaining to be answered is, however, whether the application of the principle of continuity to religion in general, and to the Christian reli-

gion in particular, may not have altered the character of Christianity so radically that it is no longer identifiable with the historic Christian system.

Application of the principle of continuity to the study of religions involved the assumption in advance that none are true or false; rather every religion expresses basic human needs and common human concerns. Variations in religious systems become thus the result of environmental differences. All religions claiming supernatural authority are declared to rest their claims upon the same dubious psychological and historical factors. Professor Burt states this argument as follows:

The more one studies them in an impartial manner, with scrupulous regard to all the relevant considerations, the less does it seem plausible to maintain that the special boasts of any particular religion on such matters are well founded. . . . Therefore it would seem that all must be rejected, as expressions of just such an unscientific attitude toward nature and uncritical belief in testimony as the theory of evolution would lead us to expect in the early religious history of mankind.⁸

Upon this basis Christianity can claim no qualitative superiority over the non-Christian systems. Its claim can be nothing more than its Founder professed loyalty to a better set of values and ideals than did the prophets of some other systems. If it possess a moral idealism above that of its rivals, it is nevertheless only quantitatively better, and at the same time essentially continuous with them. No absoluteness can thus be claimed for the Christian message which would conflict with the view of inevitable future progress. Indeed, the logic of the way of thinking under consideration would demand the expectation that the ongoing of the vital process will generate in the future a set of values which will be superior to those of Jesus of Nazareth, and better adapted to the needs of that day than are the Christian values to the basic problems of our day.

In thus construing Christianity, modern theological education has committed itself very deeply to the idea of continuity as the key to the understanding of the whole of life. It has at least been fearless in permitting its own Scriptures to be treated as continuous with other literature, and by the methods of general literary criticism. It should not be supposed that today's theological education speaks with a united voice at all points of interpretation. The American theological scene presents an interesting study in contrasts, from the ultra-conservative to the ultra-liberal. In general, however, it must be said that the weight of scholarship, finance, and influence is on the side of liberal theological interpretation, in which the idea of continuity is accepted as a dogma. The major portion of our theological institutions are confessional at this point.

The eager (not to say uncritical) acceptance in theological education of the idea of continuity manifests a deep desire to come to terms with modern culture. Nothing has been feared so much as any frown of disapproval from the direction of the scientific world. If modern thought assert that experience, utility and reason are the ultimate criteria for truth, then religious thought may follow one of two courses: it may register a protest in favor of an external authority superior to the human mind and to usual human experience; or it may seek to make peace with the modern temper upon its own terms. It is evident that the latter alternative has been elected.

The close alliance of Scholasticism with an untenable world view served to render suspect the entire scholastic method. In the reaction which came with the Renaissance, Queen Theology was exiled from the throne-room, and forced to re-locate herself in the palace of learning. Her handmaid, Philosophy, on the other hand, was admitted to the royal wardrobe and given the keys of the mansion. During the period of struggle between the forces

of the Reformation on the one hand, and of the Renaissance on the other, it was unclear precisely where the two ladies would be permitted to live and to function. With the emergence of the forces of the Renaissance as dominant in the formation of modern life, that question was settled.

Modern theological education has been conditioned, both with respect to its methods and in its ends by the high degree of social mobility which has been manifested in the domestic situation just mentioned. The Queen is no longer permitted to enter the pantry, even to eat bread and honey; she is now confined to the scullery. The Handmaid has taken over the supervision of the palace. To speak plainly, the study of philosophy has virtually superseded the study of systematic theology. The department of Doctrine has all too frequently been laid down, its functions being now delegated to the department of Philosophy of Religion.

This situation reflects the earlier revolt of the Protestant Reformation against ecclesiastical and dogmatic control of the cultural life. It is to be feared, however, that the protest has been carried too far. The church of our day has, in the name of peace, accepted a dictated peace. Reacting against a scholasticism conditioned by a perversion of the concept of the *sacred*, she has fallen victim to what amounts to a scholasticism of secularism. It must not be supposed that the sentiment for wholeness in the cultural-intellectual life which dominated the middle ages was a phenomenon peculiar to the times. In his doctrine of Holism, Jan Christian Smuts has correctly observed that this principle of togetherness finds a specialized manifestation in this universal human tendency for a synthesis of the whole field of learning.

Today's theological education is, then, far from being free. In fleeing from one type of scholasticism, she has been driven into the arms of an-

other. The chief point of difference between them is the difference in attitude toward man and his place in the cosmos.⁹ Having discarded a view of the individual as possessing dignity as a creature of God, modernity sought to re-establish his dignity immanently. In the integration of culture about the concept of continuity, today's theology is in danger of "coming to rest in the universal" which was the error of medieval scholasticism.¹⁰ The outcome in either case is an assertion of the primacy of reason, a loss of the sense of the primacy of Spirit, and a dissipation of the call of Christ for warm personal commitment.

This is a sweeping indictment of our theological education today, and one which ought not be made lightly. The realities of the situation seem, however, to warrant the conclusion that the close alliance between modern theology and the other aspects of our culture ought to have resulted in a much closer approximation of the Christian ideal in society than our civilization now manifests. Seldom has there been more talk of the Kingdom of God in situations which manifest so clearly what Paul Tillich terms the "demonic exercise of power."¹¹ Certainly there has been an unparalleled occasion in our generation for the exertion of power by organized Protestantism upon the culture with whose presuppositions it has tried to come to terms. Certainly the feelings of Christian theology have not been spared in the attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* between organized Christendom and modern culture. Yet with all this, we find the major directive factors in our modern culture relatively untouched by Christianity. For example, the labor movement, obviously one of the most powerful factors in our national life, is not only willing to ignore Christianity in her struggle for existence, but manifests a profound indifference toward all religion.

The springs of our intellectual life have been poisoned by irreligion until

the serious Christian in a rare oddity in the average college or university. Secular learning, far from being rendered sacred by contact with a concessive Christianity, is moving further from the positions consonant with the the Christian point of view. In those institutions of learning in which courses in biblical subjects are offered, the classes are too frequently supervised by second-rate teachers, and sparsely attended by introverts and weaklings. The masses of students pursue their studies in pagan fashion, with a high disdain for the principles of Christianity.

From all quarters the tide of paganism crowds in upon us. While theological educators seek to come to terms with our culture, that very culture goes its own way—feeling at times, we suspect, a secret contempt for a religion so avid to surrender the principles which have made it historically great. The modern Church, impatient with the slow methods by which biblical Christianity proposes to touch the springs of society with healing from within, is no longer accused by her foes of promising “pie in the sky by and bye”—she offers no pie at all! She seems to have forgotten, for instance, that the religious awakening under the Wesleys profoundly altered the course of life in Britain and in America, and that it did so by the slow method of individual evangelization.

Granted that the precipitation of individual repentance is much more difficult than the inducing of group repentance for (for example) wrong thinking concerning the Kingdom of God, the realities of the situation may yet vindicate the view that the regeneration of society must be effected by the slow means of the regeneration of the individual. Should this prove to be true, then the method of traditional evangelism will emerge as far less unsocial than some have felt, while the so-called social gospel may appear to be no gospel at all. To say the least, the conception of Christianity as a

purely social movement has been given a trial. Modern theological education has attempted to heed Walter Rauschenbusch's warning that

Theology has done considerable harm in concentrating the attention of religious minds on the biological transmission of evil. It has diverted our minds from the power of social transmission.¹²

To say the least, it has been no more successful in preventing the ‘social transmission of sin than has traditional theology been in preventing its transmission at another level.

In all this, the thoughtful person cannot but wonder whether modern theological education, in her passion for bringing theology into accord with the assumptions of modern culture, has not yielded to an error parallel to that committed in the Middle Ages. Scholasticism sought a synthesis of all learning under ecclesiastical authority. The synthetic product of the medieval period failed dismally to render truly sacred all which was herded beneath her roof. Our modern theology has sought to tinge her environing culture with religion. She has sought, first, to seek the ‘religious values’ which underly that culture; and, second, to convince the world that her objectives were essentially continuous with its objectives. As a result, she has too frequently been the first to ‘second the motion’ for her world, and about the last to perceive the depth of the world's malady.

* * *

The liaison between modern theological education, and our secular culture with its deep commitment to the motif of continuity involves theology in a uniformitarianism which looks forward as well as backward. Logically it may have a doctrine of future things, but no eschatology, no doctrine of the *eschaton*. Assuming that the universe has known the operation of no forces other than those now at work, it must assume that only such forces will operate in the cosmic process. It remains for us to note the man-

ner in which this doctrine is challenged by the realities on our present situation.

Modern theology has not objected to a far-off cosmic event toward which creation moves, provided that motion involve no departure from present cosmic techniques. Implicit in this view is the feeling that the present operative factors in our universe are adequate for any present or future need. Lurking in this assumption is an unconscious identification of God with human needs and human desires. Man is himself the be-all and end-all of the universe; and God must oblige man by being either sentimental or weak. The unpardonable fault in God would be an invasion of the natural order with a divine operation which would introduce any factor into history from without, or interfere with the immanent forces which bear the universe along.

A glance at man's present situation renders it by no means so clear that the forces which guarantee the survival of human civilization are all now at work. Professor D. Elton Trueblood has ably diagnosed the illness of our civilization by observing that it embodies the worst possible combination of means and ends. Technical achievement has moved beyond moral resources, so that the forces for disintegration are served by potent instruments.¹³ His assessment of the situation was made prior to the discovery of the method of atomic fission: his estimate of the situation would doubtless at this moment be more pessimistic than at the time of the writing of *The Predicament of Modern Man* in 1944.

While the doctrine of automatic progress has received a thorough shaking, there is yet a general acceptance of the dogma of the continuity of the forces by which civilization will move forward from strength to strength. The Dialectical Theologians have been voices crying in the wilderness at this point. Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr have seen well one thing: that the

Kingdom of God is not merely an earthly utopian extension of existing human institutions. They have pointed out that our age has distorted and misapplied the words of our Lord to the effect that "The Kingdom of God is within you," so as to find therein support for the view that every factor by which the Kingdom shall come is now operative in our midst.

It is lamentable that these men should have so reacted against the emphasis in liberal theology upon religious experience as a source of religious truth, as to disparage true Christian experience. Their emphasis is oblique at this point; and believers in the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection need expect little aid or comfort from them. Indeed, we will find it necessary to challenge the Theology of Crisis in its insistence that the Christian life at best must be perennially involved in paradoxes which render the witness to purity of heart sheer presumption. But we heartily welcome the emphasis upon the necessity for the introduction of factors not now at work if the Kingdom is to be ushered in.

Conservative theological education has frequently been no less naive than the liberal variety in its easy views of the solution to our pressing social problems. It has too easily assumed that when a majority of the individuals within society shall deeply and heartily embrace the saving provisions of the Gospel, then every social and economic problem will vanish. This represents an unconscious worship at the shrine of continuity—a view that the present dispensation of the Gospel is ultimate, and that to the church has been committed every needful resource for the reduction of the world to final righteousness.

Against this, the Dialectical Theologians insist that human life is involved in radical and enduring paradoxes, so that even under *optimum* conditions of the evangelization of the human race (and this to them seems a very re-

mote possibility), there would remain a need for the introduction of forces and factors now extraneous to the historical process for the establishment of the Kingdom of God. To them, we repeat, evangelical circles are deeply indebted for giving prominence in high places to these truths which have formerly been taken seriously only in humble and somewhat naive groups.¹⁴

The voice of contemporary events seems to support the contention of C. S. Lewis, who in his book *The Case For Christianity* advances the view that our world is 'enemy-occupied territory',¹⁵ and that in Jesus Christ, God has landed in human form upon it. In other words, there has been an introduction of some factor or factors which challenge the central contentions of the dogma of continuity. He ventures, further, that God will at some time invade again, this time without disguise.¹⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr hints at the same thing in his statement that 'The most explicit denial of the norm of history must be expected in the most ultimate development of history.'¹⁷

Viewed from a more practical angle, the problem presents itself in terms of an increasing complexity in the human situation, in which the disparity between technological power on the one hand, and the moral and spiritual resources for the control of such power on the other, is so great that civilization is threatened with self-destruction. Even thinkers with a fair degree of optimism recognize that we are in a world of cultural disease, which is subject to dark cultural epidemics. Add to this the loss of the presuppositions which have underlain Western culture—presuppositions which were largely derived from the Christian faith, however inadequately they were embodied in the social life,—and the development of power-techniques which seem, even to the conservative bystander, of far greater significance for destruction than any other discoveries of the modern era. Then note the sinister

clouds which threaten the equilibrium of society: the hatreds generated by the late Nazi regime, the mutual distrust with which nations eye one another, and more significant, the breakdown of sobriety and sense of moral obligation in so-called Christian countries.

A sober view of the present world-order seems to warrant the position that the events of history move toward greater and more profound confusion. How far the situation can proceed in this direction without inducing the annihilation of civilization as we now know it we cannot tell. But certainly much can be said for the view that history is rapidly assuming a form so complex and contradictory that its *dénouement* can be effected only by the intervention of the Divine in human affairs.

This would be a bitter pill for the devotees of the dogma of continuity to swallow, hardly less palatable to the conservative theological uniformitarians than to the liberals. It is the position of this editorial that the realities of the world situation reinforce a biblical eschatology which foresees a radical intervention of God in the affairs of humanity, by which shall come into history a new element and a new dimension, and through which alone can come the resolution of the rasping dissonances which are blaring at us from every direction. For the present, as Helmut Kuhn points out.

Christianity is given us to save our souls, not to save our civilization. . . . For we have our eyes riveted on an invisible drama which in grandeur and importance surpasses the vicissitudes of historical life, the rise and fall of empires and the fate of civilizations.¹⁸

Of the things which have been said, this is the sum: modern theological education has allied itself with a pagan culture, this alliance centering in the thorough application, inside theology as well as without, of the dogma of continuity. In so doing, theology has forfeited her throne and her crown. In seeking to render secular culture

sacred by simple contact, she has herself fallen victim to secularity. Her alliance with modern culture is an unnatural one, made upon terms which compromise her in all eyes. Stooping to conquer, she has fallen over forward.

In the meantime, events in modern life have moved in such a manner as to render extremely doubtful the validity of the dogma of continuity in relation to even man's immediate future. This leaves today's theological education allied with a philosophy of history which is in reality an anachronism. In consequence, she is without an answer at the point at which her answer ought to be most distinct. Sober worldlings inquire, "Whither from here?" and modern theology can only reply that she has formed the habit of taking the answers of modern culture for her own answers at this point and hence she has nothing to say. Here is crisis indeed! "Modern man has been brought to bay at the extremity of all things,"¹⁹ and theology, in her liberal form, is involved in his frustration.

The use of the term 'crisis' in the title of an editorial presumably opens the way for a maximum of diagnosis and a minimum of prescription for the malady. It is admittedly easier to sit at the bedside of the ailing patient than to minister to his suffering. Yet the bedside attitude is not wholly to be despised when the patient is as ill as modern civilization seems to be. Whatever cure be prescribed will need to take into account more than the peripheral symptoms of the disease. Again, the eschatological emphasis in the Christian message must transcend

the tendencies toward quietism and passive acceptance which have characterized much of modern prophetic Christianity.

It must be borne in mind that

The New Testament never guarantees the historical success of the 'strategy' of the Cross. Jesus warns his disciples against a too sanguine historical hope: "In this rejoice not, that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice because your names are written in heaven."²⁰

In other words, the Christian hope of an *eschaton* (end) involves an acceptance of the view that the final justification of the Gospel will not be found in history conceived as a uniform process. This will serve to render the Christian message essentially other-worldly. The task of today's theological education must continue to be the preparation of a ministry which conceives its mission in these terms.

Thus, the method and the content of theological education must contribute to the prosecution of the church's one task, the proclamation of the message of personal redemption through the self-giving of Christ on the cross. This message will not overlook the profound needs of men in this world. It will, however, refuse to take orders from the spirit of secular culture, and disdain to make its maxims the church's own. We quote again Helmut Kuhn:

Christianity teaches us to seek a Kingdom which is not of this world and to prepare ourselves for its advent by refusing to be conformed to the present *mon*.²¹

Today's theological education will be well advised to chart her course and to condition her goals in this light.

—H. B. K.

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From the Dean's Office

FRED H. LARABEE, *Dean*

Asbury Theological Seminary, now in the 23rd year of her history, is generally recognized as among the younger of the theological schools of America. The institution, however, has had a rapid growth. At first being closely integrated with Asbury College in her purposes and operation, she was not immediately recognized as an institution of merit in her own right. By 1939 the Seminary came to a position of absolute independence in charter, purposes, and operation; and soon the recognition of her worth became patent to all who made inquiry into her qualifications. Today she is a member of the American Association of Theological Schools and is asking accreditation of the Association as soon as she is deemed worthy.

The Seminary has a staff of instruction comparable to that of any young institution of its size. It has an enrollment which places her among the ten largest institutions of its kind in the Association of Theological Schools. Its enrollment has been making a 25% gain each year for the past five years.

The character of the institution is meeting with a happy response by all lovers of a pure Gospel, the proclamation of which brings sinning men and women into vital relation with the Savior of Mankind, creative of a new life in Christ Jesus.

A genuine test of the character of the work done is found in the fact that the scholarships coming as gifts for this work have not only kept pace with the increasing enrollment, but have exceeded in number the enrollment throughout the entire history of this movement.

Her endowment fund has made such rapid advancement as that already about \$600,000 now obtain in that fund.

A building is now under way which is extensive enough to provide every legitimate facility for the ongoing of the school for many years ahead. Any young man seeking a place of thorough preparation for preaching the Gospel will do well to investigate Asbury Theological Seminary.

The Seminary is winning her way by this strong emphasis on the *Word*. The dictum of the Apostle Paul, while giving instruction to Timothy, is just as pungent in meaning, just as mandatory on the young preacher today, for the fundamental needs of mankind have never changed and never will in the days of our flesh. The basic teachings of Scripture, when properly inculcated, have transforming power in human life, changing the man of sin to the man of gospel truth, love and power.

The Historical Origin of the Early Recreation Attitude of the Christian Church

THE FIRST FIVE CENTURIES*

B. JOSEPH MARTIN

Primitive Christianity was marked by great chiliastic enthusiasm. By chiliasm is meant the belief that Christ was to return to earth and reign visibly for a period of one thousand years. That return was usually held to be in the not too distant future. This belief was one of the great ethical motivating forces in apostolic and post-apostolic periods.

The moral conduct demanded of the Christians was conduct becoming a people whose citizenship was in another world. The Christians believed that they were an elect people of God, chosen from among the peoples of the earth to be his own peculiar possession. "But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people." Clement¹ speaks of the all-seeing God who chose the Lord Jesus Christ and us through him for a peculiar people. This sense of being God's specially chosen people provided a tremendous motive for righteousness. To many Christians the highest ambition was to live worthily of their calling, and as befitted the chosen of God.

"As the elect people of God the Christians were heirs of the kingdom, citizens of another world than this, and their lives must be lived so as to fit them for life there."² The meaning of this is well stated in the *Shepherd*:

He says to me, 'you know that you who are the servants of God dwell in a strange land: for your city is far away from this one. If, then,' he continues, 'you know your city in which you are to dwell, why do ye here provide lands, and make expensive preparations, and accumulate dwellings and useless building? He who makes such preparations for this city cannot return again to his own. Oh foolish, and unstable, and miserable man! Dost thou not understand that all these things belong to another, and are under the power of another? For the lord of this city will say, 'I do not wish thee to dwell in my city; but depart from this city, because thou obeyest not my laws.' . . . Have a care, therefore: as one living in a foreign land, make no further preparations for thyself than such merely as may be sufficient. . . . Instead of lands, therefore, buy afflicted souls, according as each one is able, and visit widows and orphans, and do not overlook them; and spend your wealth and all your preparations, which ye received from the Lord, upon such lands and houses. For to this end did the Master make you rich, that you might perform these services unto Him; and it is much better to purchase such lands, and possessions, and houses, as you will find in your own city, when you come to reside in it.³

The attitude of detachment, nurtured by the realization of belonging to another world instead of this, was strengthened by the belief in the speedy return of Christ when all of this world would be done away with. The Epistle of James declares, "The friendship of the world is enmity with God." First John states, "If any man love the world the love of the Father is not in him." The author of Clement after reiterating the statements of Jesus, "No man can serve two mas-

*This article is Chapter II of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Graduate School, University of Southern California in 1944.

ters" and "what profit is it if one gain the whole world and lose one's own soul?" continues:

Now this age and the future are enemies. The one speaks of adultery and corruption and avarice and deceit, the other bids these things farewell. We cannot therefore be friends of both, but must bid farewell to the one and hold companionship with the other. We reckon that it is better to hate the things that are here, for they are small and short-lived and corruptible, and to love the things that are there, for they are good and incorruptible.⁴

St. Augustine, commenting upon the loss sustained by the Christians as the result of the destruction of Rome, states what he considers to be the true wealth of Christians.

They, then, who lost their worldly all in the sack of Rome, if they owned their possessions as they had been taught by the apostle who himself was poor without, but rich within—that is to say, if they used the world as not using it,—could say in the words of Job, heavily tried, but not overcome. Like a good servant, Job counted the will of the Lord his great possession.⁵

The chiliastic ideal was less the thought of reforming the world, as it was escaping from it. So long as chiliastic expectations were the basis of the Christian's hope and largely determined his relation to the order of this present world, the Christian felt himself to be but a stranger and a pilgrim in the world, and that his real home was the kingdom of Christ, soon to be established on earth. Such a view would naturally have a tendency to cause a Christian to define his relation to the world as being in it, yet not of it. The present life was thought of as a mere probation for the life to come, (not in the Messianic hope of life here, but life in heaven), without value in itself and possessing meaning only because in it rewards are laid up for the life beyond the grave. The faithful of the first century expected to enter the Messianic kingdom directly. By the time of Augustine, the chiliastic ideal had been reinterpreted in terms of the Church visible, as embodying that

ideal. Thus, the phrase "life beyond the grave" became significant. Other-worldliness was all controlling in the life of the early church. The chief good lay not in this life but in another. So to live as to inherit the reward prepared for the saints in heaven should be the chief concern of every man. Being a citizen of heaven, the Christian must govern himself accordingly. Possessed of this hope and the virtue of humility, the Christian may pass safely through all the perils of the present life, sure of his eternal reward in heaven.

The church and the world. The church thought of itself as a separate unit from the state, and as set off by itself from the world. The antagonism to the world during the first four centuries A. D. was very present, and it was only with much difficulty that the church came to view civilization as a unity. The shift began early in the fourth century, after Constantine.

The world was defined as all those social institutions which existed outside of the church, and as a natural result that viewpoint determined, to a large extent, the Christian's attitude toward the social institutions which are classified as the kingdom of Satan. Genuine Christians viewed the world with its institutions of property, labor, force, and law as the result of sin. Harold Reed states:

When the Christian community grew to a larger dimension, it was forced to come to grips with the problems of the world or that which was regarded as secular. As a result, a dual morality developed within the church, namely, monasticism for the clergy with its high standards, and a lower standard for the laity. Monasticism was considered to be the ideal rule of life for the clergy while the laity were forced to make a living but remain from the world as far as possible. . . . Thus, the heroism of the gospel ethic plus an enlarged church, resulted in an austere and rigorous abstention from indulgence in pleasure. This discipline was for the sake of reaching high spiritual attainments.⁶

Morality of the Christians. The Christians separated themselves from

the secular life. To them, love of the world was sinful and foolish, inasmuch as the world was not only damned, but doomed. Society was a burned out crater. Its days were numbered and the end might come at any moment. An expectant Christian of the early fourth century could write:

The men famous for goodness before Moses lived when human life was just beginning and organizing itself. We live when it is near its end. They, therefore, were anxious for the increase of their descendants, and that the race might grow and flourish. But these things are of very little interest to us, who believe the world to be perishing and running down and nearing its last end. . . . while a new creation and the birth of another age is foretold at no distant time.⁷

The Christian morality was largely motivated by the expectation of Christ's Second Coming. It is to be expected that a heavy emphasis would be made on purity, chastity, piety, and separation from all deeds, things, places, and persons that might tend to cool off the Christian's zeal or cause him to waver in his loyalty to Christ, as thus conceived.

The Epistle to Diognetus, anonymous and date uncertain, is referred to as a choice piece of Ante-Nicene literature. The main themes of the epistle are the faith and manners of the Christians. Thus Mathetus writes:

The Christians are distinguished from other men neither by country nor language, nor the customs which they observe. For they neither inhabit cities of their own, nor employ a peculiar form of speech, nor lead a life which is marked by singularity. . . . They dwell in their own countries, but simply as sojourners. As citizens, they share in all things with others, and yet endure all things as if foreigners. Every foreign country is to them their native land, and every land of their birth as a land of strangers. They marry as do all; they beget children; but they do not commit abortion. They have a common table, but not a common bed. They are in the flesh. They pass their days on earth, but they are the citizens of heaven.⁸

Athenagoras, an Athenian philosopher and Christian, pleads with the emperors Marcus Aurelius Anoninus and Lucius Aurelius Commodus that

justice be shown the Christians. His defense of the Christians' morality is one of contrast with the prevailing non-Christian morality.

1. Elevated morality of the Christians.

It is, however, nothing wonderful that they should get up tales about us such as they tell of their own gods, of the incidents of whose lives they make mysteries. But it behoved them, if they meant to condemn shameless and promiscuous intercourse, to hate either Zeus, who begat children of his mother Rhea and his daughter Koré, and took his own sister to wife, or Orpheus, the inventor of these tales, which made Zeus more unholy and detestable than Thyestes himself: . . . But we are so far from practicing promiscuous intercourse, that it is not lawful among us to indulge even a lustful look. 'For,' saith He, 'he that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already in his heart. Those, then, who are forbidden to look at anything more than that for which God formed the eyes, which were intended to be a light to us, and to whom a wanton look is adultery, the eyes being made for other purposes, and who are to be called to account for their very thoughts, how can any one doubt that such persons practice self-control?'⁹

2. Christian chastity. Quoting Theophilus to Antiochus:

And concerning chastity, the holy word teaches us not only to sin in act, but even in thought, not even in the heart to think of any evil, nor look on another man's wife with our eyes to lust after her. Solomon, accordingly, who was a king and a prophet, said: 'Let thine eyes look right on, and let thine eyelids look straight before thee: make straight paths for your feet.'¹⁰

3. Vindication of Christian women.

" . . . all our women are chaste, and the maidens at their distaffs sing of divine things (such as, the Magnificat of the Virgin, the Twenty-third Psalm, or the Christian "Hymn for Eventide"), more nobly than that damsel of yours. Therefore be ashamed, you who are professed disciples of women yet scoff at those of the sex who hold our doctrine, as well as at the solemn assemblies they frequent."¹¹

4. On eating.

Some men, in truth, live that they may eat, as the irrational creatures, 'whose life is their belly, and nothing else.' But the Instructor enjoins us to eat that we may live. For neither is food our business, nor is pleasure our aim, but both are an account of our life here, which the Word is training up to immortality. . . . And it (food) is to be simple, truly plain, suiting precisely simple and artless children—as ministering to life, not to luxury.¹²

5. On drinking.

... the natural, temperate, and necessary beverage, therefore, for the thirsty is water. This was the simple drink of sobriety, which, flowing from the smitten rock, was supplied by the Lord to the ancient Hebrews (Ex. XVII; Numbers XX). It was most requisite that in their wanderings they should be temperate. . . .

... For it is not right to pour into the burning season of life the hottest of all liquids—wine—adding, as it were, fire to fire. For hence wild impulses and burning lusts and fiery habits are kindled; and young men inflamed from within become prone to the indulgence of vicious propensities.¹³ . . .

Condemnation of the prevailing amusements. Far more sweeping was their condemnation of some of the most prominent of the prevailing amusements.

It is, of course, a commonplace that among the outstanding popular forms of entertainment of the pre-Christian Roman Empire were the theatre, gladiatorial combats, and contests between beasts and men. The theatre and the amphitheatre were characteristic architectural features of the typical Roman city.¹⁴

In Rome, itself, which set the fashions for the rest of the Empire, and for especially the West, some of the shows were on a prodigious scale. It is stated that after his Dacian Victories Trajan sent down ten thousand gladiators into the arena. Even the noble-minded Marcus Aurelius, conforming with what was expected of one in his position, gave gladiatorial contests and attended them.

For gladiatorial combats and the theatre, many of the leading Christians (Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine) had nothing but condemnation. Lecky states that the fact that gladiatorial games "continued for centuries, with scarcely a protest, is one of the most startling facts in moral history."¹⁵ There was a time when the church refused to receive for baptism a professional gladiator, unless he promised to surrender his calling, and excluded from the communion those of its membership who attended the games.

In the cruel sports of the arena and

the impurities of the stage the Christian fathers recognized that paganism had its strongest and most enduring hold on the people. Tertullian explained fairly fully the reasons, as he understood them, for the prohibition to Christians of attendance at the public spectacles. Said he, "idolatry was the mother of the games." Diana presided over the hunting scenes, the God of War was the patron of the gladiatorial combats. When the bloody conflict had ended, a figure, representing the power of the world, gave the finishing stroke to the wretches who were still lingering.

The Romans, under the most Christian Emperors, Theodosius and Honorius, were still gloating over spectacles which their ancestors established to do honor to the names of departed relatives.¹⁶

Because of their connection with the non-Christian faiths which Christianity so vigorously fought, they were, therefore, improper for the faithful. Then, too, in contrast with the calm, the gentleness, and the peacefulness which are presumably the fruits of the Spirit, the shows, so Tertullian stated, stirred up rage, bitterness, and grief, and those who engaged in betting were too much agitated.¹⁷

Cyprian condemned the gladiatorial contests on the ground that "man is slaughtered that man may be gratified" and "crime is not only committed, but taught." Clement of Alexandria denounced the theatre, the race course, and others of the public spectacles. Tatian called the gladiatorial show "a cannibal of the soul."

I have seen men weighed down by bodily exercise, and carrying about the burden of their flesh, before whom rewards and chaplets are set, while the adjudicators cheer them on, not to deeds of virtue, but to rivalry in violence and discord; and he who excels in giving blows is crowned. These are the lesser evils; as for the greater, who would not shrink from telling them? Some, giving themselves up to idleness for the sake of profligacy, sell themselves to be killed; and the indigent barter himself away, while the rich man buys others to kill him. And for these

the witnesses take their seats, and the boxers meet in single combat, for no reason whatever, nor does any one come down into the arena to succor. Do such exhibitions as these redound to your credit? . . . You slaughter animals for the purpose of eating their flesh, and you purchase men to supply a cannibal banquet for your soul, nourishing it by the most impious bloodshedding. The robber commits murder for the sake of plunder, but the rich man purchases gladiators for the sake of their being killed.¹⁸

Minucius Felix denounced such contests as inculcating murder, objected to the theatre as picturing vice and as exciting the spectators to it, and opposed the chariot races.

St. Augustine reflects the prevailing official attitude of the church regarding the gladiatorial fights in the following:

. . . The gods enjoined that games be exhibited in their honor to stay a physical pestilence; their pontiff prohibited the theatre from being constructed, to prevent a moral pestilence. If, then, there remains in you sufficient mental enlightenment to prefer the soul to the body, choose whom you will worship.¹⁹

The theatres and the shows were likewise condemned by the leaders of the church. Tertullian disapproved the theatre because of its characteristic lewdness, its simulation of love, wrath, fear, and sorrow. His attitude toward the prevailing shows is well stated in the following:

We renounce all your spectacles, as strongly as we renounce the matters originating with them, which we know were conceived of superstition, when we give up the very things which are the basis of their representations. Among us nothing is ever said, or seen, or heard, which has anything in common with the madness of the circus, the immodesty of the theatre, the atrocities of the arena. the useless exercises of the wrestling-ground.²⁰

Again he writes in an inclusive manner in regard to the sins of the world:

. . . For such is the power of earthly pleasures, that, to retain the opportunity of still partaking of them, it continues to prolong a willing ignorance, and bribes knowledge into playing a dishonest part. In fact, you will find not a few whom the imperiling of their pleasures rather than their life holds back from us.

For we did not get eyes to minister to lust, and the tongue for evil with, and ears to be the receptacle of evil speech, and throat to serve the vice of gluttony, and the belly to be gluttony's ally, . . . and the hands for deeds of violence, and the feet for an erring life; or was the soul placed in the body that it might become a thought-manufactory of snares, and fraud, and injustice!²¹

Cyprian had no use for the theatres, saying that they portrayed the paricide of the old days and that "adultery is learned while it is seen." In answer to an inquiry concerning an actor's status in the church, he replies as follows:

Cyprian to Euchratius his brother, greeting. From our mutual love and your reverence for me you have thought that I should be consulted, dearest brother, as to my opinion concerning a certain actor, who, being settled among you, still persists in the discredit of the same art of his . . . the destruction of boys. . . . You ask whether such a one ought to communicate with us. This, I think, neither befits the divine majesty nor the discipline of the Gospel, that the modesty and credit of the Church should be polluted by so disgraceful and infamous a contagion.²²

Apparently the church sometimes supported converted actors until they could find other occupations, but was inclined to forbid them to continue even to teach their profession.

St. Augustine had this to say about the influence of the stage. "Stage-plays also drew me away, full of representations of my miseries and of fuel to my fire." Commodianus, a North African bishop, in writing on "*The Worldly Things Are Absolutely To Be Avoided*," writes as follows:

If certain teachers, while looking for your gifts or fearing your persons, relax individual things to you, not only do I not grieve, but I am compelled to speak the truth. Thou art going to vain shows with the crowd of the evil one, when Satan is at work in the circus with din. Thou persuadest thyself that everything that shall please thee is lawful. Thou art the offspring of the Highest, mingled with the sons of the devil.²³

Tertullian, in the following, gives a lengthy and descriptive analysis of his views regarding the theatre, shows, pleasure, and the relationship of the

Christian to the world. There is a strong other-worldly emphasis in his exhortation.

For as there is a lust of money, or glory, so there is also a lust of pleasure. . . . I think then, that under the general designation of lusts, pleasures are included; in like manner, under the general idea of pleasures, you have a specific class the 'shows'. . . . There is in all of them the taint of idolatry. . .

Our banquets, our nuptial joys, are yet to come. We cannot sit down in fellowship with them, as neither can they with us. . . . Let us mourn, then, while the heathen are merry. that in the day of their sorrow we may rejoice; lest, sharing now in their gladness, we share then also in their grief. Thou art too dainty, Christian, if thou wouldst have pleasure in this life as well as in the next: nay, a fool thou art, if thou thinkest this life's pleasures to be really pleasures.²⁴

How far this official attitude of the church and these condemnations by leading Christians proved a factor in bringing to an end the amusements is not clear. It is certain that many Christians abstained from attendance. The strong convictions of the leadership of the church imply such. However, it is also clear that many Christians did not conform to these viewpoints. Tertullian deplored the attendance of some Christians: ". . . some among you are allured by the views of the heathens in this matter (amusements)." Constantine patronized the amphitheatre for at least a decade after his toleration of the church had begun.

There is the story that in Rome the gladiatorial shows were brought to an end when, in the reign of Honorius, the monk Telemachus went into the arena to arrest the combatants and was killed by an angry mob, who objected to having their pleasures thus interrupted. Another probable factor in terminating the gladiatorial combats was the diminishing supply of possible victims. An impoverished society no longer able to recruit the arena with war captives and beasts, would probably, even without Christianity, have been deprived of the lavish amusements of a more prosperous age. Dill

believes that economy rather than virtue was the chief factor in the termination of the theatre and the circus in the west.²⁵

Many of the leading Christians not only laboured to keep the faithful from attending the theatre and the arena; they also battled what they thought to be excesses of some of the spectacles, which long survived the gladiatorial combats. Thus, John Chrysostom waged war against the horse-races and against popular farces and pantomimes. If the church found these too deeply entrenched to be uprooted, even from a nominally Christian society, it, at least, found it possible to modify and, in some instances, to abolish the pagan feasts.

One of the seven questions which Latourette asks in his volume, *The First Five Centuries*, is, "What effect has Christianity had upon its environment?" In answer to his question he states: "Upon its environment Christianity has had varying results." As previously stated, the early Christians had no plan of a thorough reconstruction of society by human effort. There was considerable tension between the individual Christian and his immediate environment. "Christians objected vigorously to certain features of the life about them, especially to most of the prominent amusements." In their abolishment Christianity had a part. The standards it enjoined were in sharp contrast to the practice of the majority. These standards the Christian community sought to enforce. "In altering the ethical tenor of men's lives Christianity proved one of the most powerful agencies which the race had thus far known." However, it must be noted that a difference between pronouncement and practice did exist.

Even in the most exemplary, however, a frank failure to attain fully the ideals was sometimes acknowledged, and for the masses of Christians the disparity between profession and practice was even more marked. This lack of accord between goal and attainment was, however, due in part to the vast differ-

ence between the objectives and the prevailing customs. Nor does it argue an entire lack of effect. Changes in habits were wrought in thousands of instances.²⁶

Christianity proved an effective force in altering the lives of men and institutions. The attitude of the early

Christians toward recreation was negative and prohibitive. Although this attitude is rooted in chiliastic expectation, there is a virility and effectiveness about it which had much to do with the elevation of the prevailing mores.

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THE CRISIS IN THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION TODAY

(References concluded from page 18)

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The Library in a Growing Theological Seminary

LENA B. NOFCIEE

The function of a seminary library, as it appears to me, is similar to that of a laboratory—the place where faculty and students find the necessary instruments, appliances and materials to implement, supplement, and further enrich the instructional program. If the trend of the latter is according to modern progressive educational methods, the library must become an integral part of the program. Assuming that the seminary library is to become such a service agency, its program and activities should be planned accordingly and its personnel qualified by training and experience to efficiently carry the program forward.

The contents of the book collection form, for the most part, the basic experimental materials. However, the information provided by the card catalog, the classification system, films, slides, recordings, music scores, pictures, etc., may also logically be considered in this category. The apparatus may well include various forms of equipment, such as projectors, reading machines, bibliographical aids, indexes, and many reference books. The members of the library staff are the technicians selecting, acquiring and preparing the materials and equipment, and guiding in their use. A faculty library committee actively assisting in policy forming, book selection and guidance in use of the library's resources are technicians as well.

What types of books are considered essential in building a seminary library collection? Certainly those which supplement the curriculum are of primary importance. Chief among these are the various versions of the

Bible, Biblical history, archaeology, and books about Bible characters and events; church history, biographies of the church fathers, and outstanding personalities in various religious faiths; books on religious activities and services; applied theology; philosophy and psychology of religion; ethics; homiletics; apologetics; Christian education; Christian literature, music, drama, and art; pastoral counseling and books on doctrine. These books must be supplemented by general books in the same fields of knowledge. Church history cannot be divorced from the history of a given country, period or people. The same is true of philosophy, sociology, psychology and many other major subjects in the curriculum. In addition, books of general and specific reference, such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, commentaries, and the like must be included. This is not all—periodicals of a general nature and in the specific fields must supplement the book collection. There also important government documents, lectures, sermons, minutes of Conferences, abstracts, research studies and a wealth of denominational and sectarian literature. All of these are not always necessary. However, the problem of selection is thus further complicated. The library can legitimately be expected to purchase a goodly percentage of current religious books, periodicals, and publications from at least a selected list of theological seminaries. These reading materials should be further supplemented by well selected and appropriate films, slides, recordings, music scores, and the necessary equipment to use these

aids effectively.

How much material should be provided for the individual student's recreational and informational reading and faculty research will in many instances be determined by demand, the budget or the physical resources of the library. The library staff cannot dismiss lightly its responsibility for encouraging and even stimulating such requests. With the limited demands for and the infrequent reprintings of many desirable theological books, one must continually resort to inter-library loans. My happy experience has been that theological seminary librarians are most generous in granting such privileges.

A definite part of the instructional program should be given to teaching students how to (a) use library materials effectively, (b) compile bibliographical information, especially if theses are required, and (c) how to organize their own materials for future effectual use. Alumni and others interested in securing materials of special doctrinal emphasis in various seminary libraries should receive some consideration.

After the vast problem of deciding what to buy and the number of copies needed has been solved, the books must be ordered, received, processed and made available for use. Some of these operations, especially those of a routine nature, can be satisfactorily performed under supervision by non-professional personnel. Technically trained and experienced librarians are absolutely necessary for cataloging, classification, reference and administrative duties.

The classification scheme to be adopted is another problem. Most libraries use the Dewey or Library of Congress system. The Union Theological Seminary notation has been especially designed to meet the needs of special libraries of this type and has through the years proven that it is sufficiently expansive, yet not too detailed or complicated, for practical use. Its

imperfections seem fewer than either of the above mentioned classifications when applied to theological seminary library materials. Miss Julia Pette, the originator of the scheme, and Dr. Julia Markley, librarian, Union Theological Seminary, are always willing to assist libraries adopting the classification and are making the necessary changes and adaptations to meet growing Theological Seminary library needs. An ever increasing number of theological schools are adopting this classification.

Not until the books have been selected, processed and logically arranged on the shelves and the cards filed in the catalog are the books ready for use.

It is the responsibility of the staff to carry on an orderly procedure of making library materials available, to supply information and to assist faculty and students in the use of library aids and materials. Students usually need special guidance in the use of unfamiliar resources. A person experienced and skilled in the use of reference, research and source materials is an invaluable addition to any library staff and is especially so in a theological seminary library. All staff members, however, must be familiar enough with the library collection to answer promptly and correctly the general reference questions.

The quarters where the library materials are housed are usually referred to as the library. This is one of the definitions given in dictionaries and has become so deeply rooted in our thinking that many people are unaware of the "service agency" aspect of an active library program. To be sure the books and other library materials must have housing facilities—those as conveniently located as possible to the class rooms. The seminary library building should combine attractive and appropriate design with utility and sound building construction.

A functional building should pro-

vide for the usual facilities, a reference or reading room, stack and perhaps a reserve room. A librarian's office easily accessible to faculty, students and staff, work and service rooms for the staff are equally necessary. Carrels for easy stack use; sound-proof conference rooms, one large and several smaller ones, specially constructed facilities for the use of audio-visual equipment; faculty study rooms and a browsing room or its equivalent are vital additions. Provisions for displays, and housing facilities for exhibit materials are a necessity. A minimum of twenty years' expansion should be planned and the building so designed that additions can be constructed without marring its balance and usefulness. Adequate natural and artificial lighting; comfortable, practical and appropriate equipment and furniture are essential. Even though the building should be fire and sound proof some provision for safeguarding rare books and the like must be made.

The foregoing library program is ambitious, difficult and requires careful planning and execution. Such library programs, however, would make the instructional phase of seminary

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THE CHALLENGE OF THE DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY

(Concluded from page 32)

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The Challenge of the Dialectical Theology To Modern Educational Theory

ANNE W. KUHN

It is always necessary in dealing with the Dialectical Theology, or the Theology of Crisis, to remember that the movement is an amorphous thing. It emerged during the period immediately following the first World War; its thought underwent considerable change on the Continent in the post-war period, and experienced a radical transformation as it grew as a transplanted movement in the United States.

It is agreed that this type of theology sprang, in large part, from the thought and writings of Søren Kierkegaard. The Crisis Theologians have revived and given a theological interpretation to his writings, feeling that they accurately diagnose the case of 20th century Europe. Just as the thought of Kierkegaard refused to be channelled, so also the Dialectical Theology has assumed several shapes, characteristic among which is that issuing from its pessimistic European form as it has been transmuted in America into a passion for social reform.

Barth furnishes in the Preface to his second edition of *The Epistle to the Romans* what may be considered a common denominator for the Crisis Theology.

... if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard calls the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth'. The relation between such a God and such a man, and the relation between such a man and such a God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy.¹

The Dialectical Theology is likewise deeply indebted to the Existential School in philosophy, which is a deriv-

ative of the tradition of Kierkegaard, in which Heidegger and others modified the great Dane's individualism by an emphasis upon man's total existential situation as he is associated with nature, things, animals, and his fellow men.² The social interest which characterized most of the thinkers of the movement under consideration is probably a derivative of the Existential School. Barth has, however, reacted against some of the tendencies in the thought of Heidegger which seem to the latter to minimize the sense of tragedy which the life situation seems to lay upon the thoughtful man. It is not pertinent to the proposition of this paper to further develop the system of the Dialectical Theologians, but rather to inquire how this system, particularly as it is embraced in the United States does logically, as well as practically, bear upon contemporary theory of education. It is necessary once more to state the *caveat* issued earlier—that the Crisis Theology is a mercurial thing, difficult to pick up in the hand; and hence conclusions concerning it must be drawn with care.

It is the aim of this article to seek to discover the manner in which the Dialectical Theology constitutes a challenge to present-day theory of education, from the standpoint (1) of its metaphysics; (2) of its anthropology; and (3) of its ethics.

I

In general, the thinkers under consideration (especially Karl Barth, H. Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Edward Geismar, and Wilhelm Pauck) tend to discount philosophy, at least insofar as it attempts to furnish answers to ultimate questions. To

the question, "Is a philosophy of religion, strictly speaking, possible?" the answer of these men would generally be in the negative. Yet the system does make certain generalizations concerning the nature of the universe.

The first and most important of these is that the universe embodies certain radical and enduring contradictions. The enduring antitheses which are held to run throughout the theological situation, namely the "infinite qualitative distinction" between eternity and time, and between God and man—these have definite metaphysical overtones. While modern thought has attempted to understand eternity in terms of time, and God in terms of man, these thinkers deny that the relationships existing in the case of these two pairs can properly be described in terms of either continuity or contiguity. This necessarily involves things as they essentially are, and indicates that the system in question has a metaphysics, which is characterized by Barth's disjunctive conceptions.

The anti-intellectual strain in the Crisis Theology may be traced to two factors: the reaction of Barth against the scholastic method of Heidegger; and the reaction of Kierkegaard (the intellectual forbear of both Heidegger and Barth) to the facile rationalism of Hegel. It must not be supposed, however, that the dialectical Theology was wholly an inherited thing. It grew up, rather, out of situations similar to that from which Kierkegaard's thought came. Even the melancholy Dane felt in his environment the element of contradiction which seems to be inherent in all of human existence.

Karl Barth, like Kierkegaard, saw within the historical situation (as well as within himself) that which forbid the completion of the rationalistic triangle in Hegelian fashion. Instead of an optimistic and triumphant synthesis, he found the universe to justify only a frame of mind which must "stop short and content itself with the whole-

ness which is divined but not perceived in a balanced pair of opposites."³

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the nature of the metaphysics of the system under question. The contradictions in which human experience finds itself constantly involved are derived from the nature of our world. The universe is rent open; "... nature itself is disturbed and thrown into confusion by that which is unnatural, by the contradiction which comes from the mind and spirit of men."⁴ The implications of this last quotation for theology need not detain us here; Brunner is reacting against the facile monistic view of the universe, both in respect to its development and to its present nature.

The emphasis of the thinkers under study is, however, not primarily upon the universe itself, but upon the universe *qua* understood by man. It is at this point that its impact is exerted upon modern education. First and most obvious of the effects of such a system would be its caution against dogmatic finality in the study of the sciences, and particularly of the science of man. The crisis theologians themselves incline to accept the developmental view of man; at the same time they allow that we today know far less about man than our predecessors thought they knew.

The dualism of the movement, derived from the Barthian insistence upon the radical disconnection between the supernatural and the natural thus, serves to caution modern education against assuming that the universe is a neat package, waiting to be untied, and to reveal to the casual student its inner secrets.

The situation of man is held to be not an epiphenomenon, but a genuine index to the real nature of the world. It must be borne in mind that only very recently is America coming to approximate the European scene. But now emotional strains are appearing; we are at the threshold of learning the meaning of suffering. Our predic-

ament is bringing into acute form the realization that something is radically wrong. The universe, so recently appearing willing to eat out of our hands (being rapidly subjected to scientific control) suddenly eludes our grasp. The concept of necessary progress, as a principle underlying the universe, seems no longer capable of defense. Instead of gaily riding the crest of the "wave of the future," we find that we may not, after all, live in that kind of a world.

Educational theory is not escaping the impact of this realization, which was seen more or less clearly a decade ago by the crisis theologians. They felt that they could read the trend of things, from the clue which the universe revealed, —that of radical and enduring disjunction written deep into the nature of things. We seem to have misread our world; if so, we are no more blameworthy than our educators, who have followed Condorcet, Comte and Spencer in believing that man, after reviewing his past, would in time "remove all inequalities and perfect human nature."

The perfectibility of human nature, and belief in necessary and continued progress, have been twin dogmas, with clear metaphysical bases. Since 1900, these concepts have shaped educational theory; only recently have they been questioned. The dialectical theologians have served as gad-flies, stinging the educational world awake by questioning these assumptions. They have pointed out that change is not equal to progress, and that material development may be a false barometer of genuine and substantial human advancement.⁵

It must not be supposed that the thinkers in question are social coroners or that they categorically deny the possibility of progress. They acknowledge thankfully the sociological and legal gains that have been achieved, such as the generally-accepted "freedoms," the equality of opportunity, and the increased measure of

social and economic security available under democratic society. They protest, however, any view of life which makes temporal progress an ultimate, or which insists that the universe is so geared that progress is inevitable.

Thus, they challenge educators to question their goals, and to examine that which they considered worthy of whole-hearted pursuit. In protest against a mere science-ism, they insist that the universe must be understood in terms of a hidden dimension, God as *transcendent-immanent*. The application of such a view challenges the naturalism and the anthropocentric character of modern education, imploring it to search whether it may not have, after all, erred in assuming with Rousseau that nature and human nature are essentially good, and "that the first movements of nature are always right." For if these latter sentiments be true, then education without reference to a Deity is to be preferred, since things are not to be judged in terms of Him anyway. The attempt to interpret all of reality in theistic terms cannot but clash with such an educational theory as that of Dewey, who denies the existence of transcendental categories by reference to which things are to be understood, and who finds all of the canons of understanding to emerge from the ongoing of all organic activities.⁶

This does not mean that the crisis theologians deny that historical and cultural relativisms exist; it does mean that in this type of thought they are not considered to be ultimate—that they are transcended in the categories of *God* and *eternity*, and that the maximum of possible human comprehension of these relativisms comes by viewing them "from above," that is, viewing them from the point of view "of a God who transcends, yet is immanent in the historical process."

From the foregoing it appears that the Crisis Theology is more effective, through its metaphysical assumptions,

to expose the presuppositions of modern educational theory, than to offer a clearly-defined solution. It is fairly clear at present that they have pointed the way to a diagnosis of our ills, and that they are correct in supposing that our educational system must bear its fair share of responsibility for the fact that our age has lost its way. Whether the proposed metaphysics of the system is justifiable, and whether it has to date been sufficiently well defined to render it workable is a separate question.

II.

Starting ostensibly as a new departure in theology, the Theology of Crisis became rapidly metamorphosed into an anthropology. This may perhaps have come through its genesis, under circumstances of disillusionment and despair in Europe, and in the fine foresight which some of its thinkers exercised in America, even in the rosy days of the late 'twenties.⁸ It must be said in favor of such men as Reinhold Niebuhr that they were quick to detect moral unsoundness beneath surface-prosperity. It is further to their credit, that whereas today they might sit back in triumphant detachment, and say "we told you so," yet they do not do so, but are inclined to share the responsibility for a world aflame.

But to return to the subject in hand, after this brief parenthesis: it cannot be denied that with its ostensible emphasis upon God and upon eternity, the Crisis Theology never allows the human problem to move out of sight. Though it proposes to correct the Humanism of this century, it does not seek to do so by devoting little attention to the human problem. Rather, it endeavors to view man "from above," and to understand him in terms of God, not the contrary.

One of the basic protests leveled by the dialectical theologians against modern education is that its theory is oriented in humanism—a humanism of an especially vicious type. As a result of the emergence, in the nineteenth

century, of the science of sociology, modern education has pursued paths which have led to the loss of the individual. Such a statement presupposes a definition of the term 'individual' in terms other than that of numerical distinctness. In naturalistic theories, the individual is lost in the emphasis upon the interpretations of consciousness, and in which philosophical approaches to self-consciousness are lost in naturalistic explanations.⁹

In idealism, proper individuality is lost, not in a failure to perceive the depths of the dimensions of the human spirit, but in the identification of "the self-transcendent ego with universal spirit."¹⁰ Thus, whatever the rational universal, whether the Absolute Mind, or the State, a proper view of the self is lost. In Romanticism, the individual is held to fare no better; for in this attempt at the championing of the rights of the self, the self is in reality either subordinated to the collective group through his relations to the realm of nature or else he becomes himself a god, with no law save his own will-to-power.

The thinkers under study would save the individual-self from his fate in modern thought (whatever direction this may have taken since the Renaissance) by appealing to him, in the name of Christianity, as an isolated individual. Whatever may be the social ideology of such men as Brunner and Niebuhr, they regard a proper view of the individual unit as basic to a free society. At this point, the movement challenges modern education at the point of naturalism. By interpreting the goal of life in terms of adaptation to biological and other existing conditions, education trains men for the life-in-the-hand—for a utilitarian civilization.

Curiously enough, the same writers challenge some of the individualistic assumptions of the modern theory of education. While some educators criticize American thinking (and indirectly American education) for its lack of

a keen social consciousness by reason of the individualism that is natural to most of our people, Niebuhr criticizes our educational theory for its over-individualism.¹¹ The solution to the human problem is sought through the increase of man's individual ability. Thus, viewed in one way, modern education is still "bourgeois"—it still thinks in terms of *laissez faire*. Such a program develops self-assertion without any compensatory preparation for living in the social group. The consequent transcendence of his physical and natural limitations renders him arrogant in the belief that he is "captain of his soul"—with the tendency toward the intensification of the human social problem, due to the increase of his power over his fellows.

It is no longer possible to postpone the question of reconciling these two apparently contradictory protests: the one objection that modern education has tended to lose the individual in the social group; and the second, that the role of individual has been falsely exaggerated in modern education. The difficulty is resolved when we note that what the crisis theologians are protesting is the inadequacy of the modern educators' view of the individual. It has been said (*supra*) that individuality is more than mere numerical distinctness: it lies in the fact, stated by Brunner thus:

Man has been created in and for the word of God, and this makes him the being who is responsible. This fact unmistakably determines man as an individual. Responsibility is that which sets the individual as individual apart and makes him independent. . . . To the extent in which the Christian faith intensifies the content and the value of responsibility, as compared with the ordinary idea of responsibility, the content and the value of individual existence is also intensified.¹²

Thus, this thinker sees in the "modern" view of individuality a lack of dimension. Man is viewed within a merely humanistic frame of reference, and without regard to his accountability to a transcendent Creator, to Whose freedom he is subordinate.¹³

Insofar as modern education has lost its emphasis upon a Christian view of individuality, and its "What is man that thou art mindful of him?" it has no adequate basis for a philosophy of education which shall train men to function in a democratic society as one who adjusts his rights to the rights and needs of others. This problem will appear again in the next section of this article dealing with the criticism which these thinkers level at modern educational theory upon the basis of the ethical presuppositions of the Dialectical Theology.

The next important objection which these thinkers raise to modern education is its assumption that the solution to the human problem can be found in the development of intelligence. Niebuhr feels that educators are still unduly under the spell of the Socratic dictum that "Virtue is knowledge, and can be taught," and that, beginning with the Renaissance, modernity has been mistaken in imagining that man is to be conceived primarily in terms of the uniqueness of his rational faculties. Thus, educators seek (and expect) the solution of men's ills in the improvement of his rational faculties.

The distrust of reason which characterizes the Crisis Theology has been feared by many who "saw red" before they seriously considered the writers' meanings. It is impossible to escape the impression that Reinhold Niebuhr has at times been condemned without fair trial. What he seems to mean is this: Education can, by cultivating reason, solve many problems. But man is a finite creature, and hence incapable of taking in "the needs of others as vividly as he recognizes his own, or to be as quick in his aid to remote as to immediately revealed necessities." Thus, reason is limited by the range of man's possible perspective, and, as well, by its ability to set for conduct "goals more inclusive, and socially more acceptable, than those which natural impulse prompts."¹⁴

Education, then, fails to take due ac-

count of the factor of finiteness in its cultivation of reason—either finiteness in respect to its temporal and spatial perspectives, or in respect to actualizing the goals which it discerns, “nor even of adequately defining, the unconditioned good which it dimly apprehends as the bound and goal of all its contingent values.”¹⁵

In all this, modern education has not only failed to recognize the limitations of the culture of reason and the enlargement of intelligence; it has likewise failed to render reason the master of impulse. Rather, it frequently becomes, through some types of psychology (which shape to a large extent modern education), an instrument which justifies the actions of unrestrained impulse, and to open avenues for its ungoverned activity. Such a challenge would be directed with most point toward the psychology of Freud, in which reason is reduced to a place second to impulse.

Thought and reason are anything but dominant forces in man's nature; they exist only to serve the great primal urges and desires that are the real masters of human conduct. The intellect is their servant, and a corruptible servant, not above twisting and concealing and manipulating the truth in the interest of its powerful masters. Always reason is motivated by affective needs: it exists to do their bidding; directly or indirectly it works to procure their satisfactions. . . . Even the most logical and realistic thought is determined by personal and primitive desire.¹⁶

Against such a contention, Niebuhr would probably say that such an abuse of reason was a derivative of an exaggerated trust of reason, not balanced by a proper consideration of the role of the emotions, nor accompanied by a proper discipline of the impulsive side of nature. His criticism would again take the form of an indictment of the overly-intellectual emphasis in education, and of its failure to properly estimate the organic unity of man's personality—the inter-relatedness of his intellectual and appetitive powers.

Enough has been said to indicate that the Crisis Theology, in its anthro-

pology, challenges modern educational theory at (especially) two points: (1) it contends that there has been lost the transcendental frame of reference within which alone a proper individualism may be conserved in harmony with the requirements of a democratic society; and (2) it contends that its intellectualism has lost sight of the organic character of human personality, and hence has failed to cultivate reason for her proper function.

III.

The emphasis of the Dialectical Theology upon such factors as *crisis* and *judgment* comes as a wholesome corrective to the easy optimism which has underlain much of the educational theory of today.¹⁷ The ethical views of Niebuhr and Brunner deserve some more detailed analysis in an article of this type, inasmuch as they involve a type of world-outlook which has a considerable degree of plausibility in times like these.

Brunner's ethical theory centers in his view of the “Orders” and of the “Imperative,” between which this writer divides the field of human endeavor. In the *Orders*, Brunner finds both a divine institution and a human fitness for living within their mandates. They are *given* to the individual, they make life livable to him, and it is his duty to either affirm them or to contribute to their modification by actively infusing them with Christian principles.¹⁸

These Orders represent the will of God in a secondary and imperfect form, and are five in number:

1. The family
2. The economic system
3. The state
4. The cultural pattern
5. The Church.

Membership in the Orders affords an opportunity for the expression of the ‘life of love’; in those instances in which there is a discrepancy between the actual society and the ideal of Christian society,

. . . the individual is justified in acting upon

his personal calling by the fact that God has called, and that He will overrule finite misjudgments and pardon errors committed in the face of the paradoxical situations commonly called 'conflicting duties.'

Brunner's view of the *Imperative* represents a criticism of both naturalistic and rationalistic ethics, and points to another and transcendental source for ethics—that is, God as moral revealer.¹⁹ Such an ethic may be expected to conflict at times with man's 'natural' desires, and with his reason as well. Hence, it addresses itself to man's *faith*.

The fidelistic character of Brunner's ethics is modified somewhat in the moral philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr. Unlike Brunner, he insists that the law of love is relevant to social problems on a wider scale than the mere person-to-person and face-to-face level. Niebuhr sees the "natural man" as obligated to "emulate the love of God, to forgive as God forgives, to love his enemies as God loves them."²⁰ Thus the 'love ideal', while impossible of full realization under existing conditions of human society, is still relevant to the whole of human life; the pursuit of this ideal *does* raise the general level of human life.

Although this view is criticized from some quarters as either a contemplation of a beautiful ideal, or as a justification for the existence of the margin between the real and the ideal, it is not without its point. It serves, first of all, to call attention to the tremendous complexity of the human social problem, and the inadequacy of mere "social intelligence" as an antidote to our evils. A derivative of this is the realization that an industrialized society, with absentee ownership, and remote control of the processes of production, generate social problems incapable of ready solution.²¹

This challenges education to an ethical approach which renders ethical relativities as non-ultimate. It insists upon fixed *principles* in ethics, as given by a transcendental Lawgiver, in

relation to which *precepts* must be determined, often times, upon something analogous to the Catholic view of a hierarchy of values.

Closely allied with this is the insistence by the crisis theologians upon an interpretation of man's ethical nature in terms of its blackness. Instead of acquiescing in the view that man's character is merely gray in spots, these thinkers insist that sin has reached the center of the human personality, and has produced reverberations in his moral life which call for something more than a mere *e-duco*, a calling-forth of self-expression. Practically, this involves a challenge to a redefinition of the *aims* of education, in terms of a Christo-centric basis for moral instruction. This issues in a renewed call for emphasis upon *content*, instead of mere method.²²

Related to this is the criticism offered by the thinkers under study against modern education's attempt to locate the heart of the Christian message in its ethical emphasis. In other words, Christians are not made by a facile *imitatio Christi*, conceived in terms of a general criterion for the reconstruction of the life of the group. Christian ethical living is rather, say the theologians of the Crisis school, the fruition of the "encounter" of the individual with his God.²³

This brings the consideration of the challenge of the system under study to modern education back to the question mentioned earlier, namely that of the status of the individual in a sound philosophy of education. If the locus of the moral problem be the individual, then education is on the wrong track in its stress upon mere methodology conceived in terms of "socially useful projects." Instead of elaborate committee discussion and ideological programs, (which have come into disrepute since the Munich Pact), these thinkers insist that the realities of the situation require a vigorous application of the sanctions flowing from the Orders. While this distrust of the

value of reasoned exploration of man's ethical ills (which is a form of education) may go too far, it serves at any rate to underscore the whole protest of the dialectical theologians against a bland acceptance of the Socratic dictum in the moral instruction of man. It serves to show the depth of the moral problem, and seeks to emphasize the necessity of a radical (and religious) cure for man's moral obliquity.

* * *

From the foregoing considerations, it seems clear that the Theology of Crisis serves as an irritant to contemporary educational theory. To function thus, it does not necessarily offer an adequate alternative; in point of fact, it seems to the writer to fail to do so. As a corrective, it challenges certain bland presuppositions which modern educational philosophy has held, in the spirit of optimism which characterized the 'twenties', a rosy view of man long after the realities of the world scene ceased to justify such optimism.

However nebulous some of the solutions of these thinkers may seem, the thinkers themselves have been penetrating in their analysis of our most pressing ills, and have fearlessly applied canons of criticism which rendered them unpopular in the extreme. One element in this challenge seems to tower above the rest: the charge that

in all of the modern emphasis upon the 'worth of the individual', that true individuality (as distinguished from mere particularity) is in constant peril of being lost. As an antidote to this, the crisis theologians insist upon the theistic postulate as an essential frame of reference within which the *self* may be preserved. The God-reference becomes not only the cornerstone of a true metaphysics; it as well the necessary fixed star, in line with which a true anthropology and a valid ethical theory can be maintained.

There are indications that this protest has not gone unheeded. While such thinkers as Harrison S. Elliott have protested the proposed solutions of Brunner and Niebuhr, they yet recognize the validity of the criticisms which these men have levelled against modern educational philosophy.²⁴ Again, the appearance of a book entitled *Christ and Christian Education* (instead of religious education) by an author who would probably have scoffed at his present title twenty years ago, indicates that the protest is not being wasted.

Thus, the system is a disturber of a false peace; its voice comes to us reinforced by the realities of the time, and calls us to an education "that hath foundations," and summons us to rethink our world-view, in terms of the statement that "its builder and maker is God."

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¹²Brunner, op. cit., p. 279.

¹³Niebuhr, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 92.

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The Summer Issue

A PREVIEW

The Summer Issue, to appear in June, will feature an article by George A. Turner which will be of special interest to the constituency of THE ASBURY SEMINARIAN. Professor Turner will publish a study in the historical origins of the doctrine of Christian Perfection, based upon his doctoral dissertation which has recently been accepted by Harvard University.

Among the books recently received, the following have been especially selected for review in the June issue:

Revised Standard Version of the New Testament. Thomas Nelson and Sons, \$2.00.

The Meaning of Human Experience. By Lynn Harold Hough. Abingdon-Cokesbury, \$3.00.

The Infallible Word, A Symposium. By members of the faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary. Presbyterian Guardian Publishing Corp., 1505 Race St., Philadelphia, \$2.50.

The Christian Answer. By Paul Tillich, Theo. M. Greene, Geo. F. Thomas, Edwin E. Aubrey, and John Knox. Edited by Henry P. Van Dusen. Scribners, \$2.50.

The Great Divorce. By Clive Staples Lewis. Macmillan, \$1.50.

Puritanism and Democracy. By Ralph Barton Perry. Vanguard Press, \$5.00.

Psychology of Religion. By Paul E. Johnson. Abingdon-Cokesbury, \$2.00.

And Others.



